Since its introduction in 1969, the phrase \frame problem" has been attributed various interpretations. Most researchers in the eld of Arti cial Intelligence, de ne the frame problem as the problem of nding an e ective representation for reasoning about change. Logicians use the phrase to refer to a much less general, technical problem within logic, whereas philosophers tend to interpret the phrase as the more general problem of determining (ir)relevance. All in all, this discrepancy has led to considerable confusion about the meaning of the phrase. We contend that most of this confusion can be avoided, if the original (robotics) context of the frame problem is adhered to. We present an engineering view on the frame problem that allows us to strip the frame problem from associated problem notions like quali cation and rami cation. The problem that remains is intimately related to the knowledge acquisition bottleneck in knowledge engineering.
The Frame Problem
Literature speci cally devoted to the frame problem tends to present the reader with a myriad of disparate views 13] . Referring to the rst description of the frame problem 12] as the Original Frame Problem (OFP), we condense the multitude of later views into three main categories, referred to as the Logical Frame Problem (LFP), the Pre-Logical Frame Problem (PLFP), and the General Frame Problem (GFP). The LFP is situated in the context of classical AI planning, and assumes that an adequate, precise speci cation of (human) domain knowledge is available. It is a purely technical problem within logic. The PLFP, situated in the same context, pertains to the di culty of specifying not yet articulated domain knowledge in a surveyable, true-to-life model. Many PLFP investigators question the applicability of LFP solutions to reasoning about change in the real world. The GFP questions the entire context of the (P)LFP, that is, the adequacy of the representational foundation of classical AI planning 15].
The Original Frame Problem
The frame problem was introduced as a problem within situation calculus, a representational formalism for reasoning about change in terms of the e ects of actions 12]. Due to the reliance of situation calculus on classical rst order logic, any derivation that some fact persists upon performing an action requires explicit representation in the form of an axiom. It doesn't su ce to state what will change as a consequence of an action; one also has to state what doesn't. This was perceived as an annoying obligation, especially in those (many) cases where persistence of some fact seems obvious.
The OFP thus seems to be a problem within logic. However, the page header \Principles for designing intelligent robots" suggests that the OFP should not be approached as a purely logical problem, but rather with the ultimate goal of designing intelligent robots at the back of one's mind. This goal context is still present in 7], but it seems to be forgotten more and more often in later years. In recent publications, especially those concerned with logical aspects, it is often completely absent. We consider the isolation of the frame problem from its goal context a major cause of confusion. Consequently, we portray the frame problem against the background of \the design of robots that get by without human supervision in an open environment". In the remainder of this paper, we will refer to this as \the ultimate goal".
The Logical Frame Problem
The logical aspect of the original frame problem has evolved into a purely theoretical problem within logic. This Logical Frame Problem concerns the question how rst order logic should be expanded so as to be able to specify persistence concisely.
The solution of the LFP is sought in a suitable semantical de nition for circumscription 11]. Circumscription amounts to a strong closed world assumption, that is, one that allows using negationas-failure to infer the falsehood of complex formulas, rather than only atomic ones.
As the application of circumscription to toy problems in temporal reasoning rendered bizarre conclusions, more appropriate de nitions of circumscription evolved 4] 14]. However, all of these LFP solutions presume that a complete and accurate description of domain knowledge already exists. In view of the \open environment" clause in our ultimate goal, these approaches are therefore not su cient to cope with the frame problem in practice.
The Pre-Logical Frame Problem
Several issues have been brought up that prohibit the straightforward application of an LFP solution to AI planning for real-world problems.
The Quali cation Problem concerns the infeasibility of stating all of the preconditions for an action in a real-world environment. As an example, McCarthy 10] mentions a far-fetched precondition for driving o with a car: there must not be a potato in the tailpipe. The Rami cation Problem 3] concerns the di culty of stating (concisely) all of the consequences an action may have, depending on circumstances. A small number of approaches has been proposed addressing the more fundamental problem of designing a framework apt to express the relationship between actions and predicates in AI planning domains in a surveyable manner. A common characteristic of these approaches is their focus on modularization of domain knowledge. However, e ective modularization of the set of actions and predicates appeared to be very di cult, even for seemingly simple planning tasks 7] 13].
One of the approaches associates actions with frames, to which a number of properties can be attached. Any property not attached to a frame should be assumed to persist under the associated action. For computational e ciency, disjoint frames are desirable. It appeared, however, that small disjoint frames were too rigid to adequately describe potential in uences, whereas enlarging the frames led to a local frame problem within each frame 7] .
The causal connections approach does not require disjoint frames. Any two entities that potentially in uence each other are labeled causally connected. The`space complexity' of the representation can be reduced by representing the \causally connected"-relation as a set of immediate connections and a single transitivity rule. However, as Hayes 13] remarks, events may cause the causal connections themselves to change, in which case we have a recursive frame problem.
Event based representation features a reversal of the roles of action and situation descriptors 9]. In classical (\state-based") planning, an operator de nes an action in terms of the predicates that may be in uenced when the action is applied (rami cations), and the predicates that determine whether its application will bring about the intended e ect (quali cations). In event-based planning the dependency is reversed. A predicate is de ned in terms of the actions that are liable of in uencing it. Whereas this change in the knowledge organization reduces the time complexity of planning, it is unclear whether it avoids a recursive frame problem.
The General Frame Problem
Whereas the PLFP approaches still leave much of the ontological foundation of classical AI planning intact, the GFP involves questioning the ontology underlying AI planning to a greater extent.
Current views towards open systems 8], and robust robot behavior 2] suggest that searching for the ultimate a priori representation (for change) is not a good way to turn AI problem solving into an adequate technology for essentially underspeci ed real-world problems.
The terminology (e.g., epistemological and metaphysical adequacy) used in literature about the frame problem has also drawn the attention of philosophers. The Dreyfus brothers 13] regard the frame problem as a symptom of the inadequacy of human language to prescribe a course of action. They argue that the majority of human activities are not (entirely) deliberate, but rather reactive. Only novice problem solvers tend to articulate a desired course of action before actually executing it. We shall return to this subject after the presentation of our own { engineering { view on the frame problem 2 An Engineering View on the Frame Problem While discussing the general frame problem, it is often suggested that it is situated solely at the ontological level of`framework design'. However, an analysis that remains forever on the ontological level oats in mid air. The proposal of an ontology remains a rather gratuitous statement, if one does not test its adequacy at a lower level of abstraction. In our view, most of the ontologies proposed in the context of the GFP su er from this shortcoming.
As a rst cure, we distinguish the construction of an abstract framework (the ontological level) from the instantiation of such a framework. We shall refer to the latter as the modeling level, because it involves modeling a particular domain in terms of a general representational framework. The bulk of modeling activity that takes place in this world is situated at the modeling level only, that is, the representational framework is xed. The design of a new framework is a much more di cult endeavor than the construction of a new model within an existing framework. In table 1 we to indicate this in the (type of) activities associated with the ontological and the modeling level of what we call a \representation bootstrapping problem", a problem of designing a representational framework for a vaguely described task in a vaguely described domain in the absence of tried foundations (hence the term bootstrapping). We take the general frame problem to be an example of such a problem. The domain is, worse than vaguely, described as \a real world domain". Though formal logic constructs may provide a foundation, it is not a tried one. In fact, it seems unlikely that the foundation will prove adequate in view of the fact that it requires complete domain knowledge. The task involved in the frame problem, to determine what would change upon the execution of an action, may be sharply de ned as long as we do not tamper with underlying concepts like action, but since the general frame problem involves questioning the adequacy of such concepts, the sharpness is illusory. look at the general frame problem, it should be obvious that, in order to provide the output required (an adequate framework), a general frame problem solver must experiment at the modeling level. Moreover, whereas \feelings of dissatisfaction" or \concocted counterexamples" will generally be the primary falsi cation criteria for ontological adequacy of a framework, they are not the ultimate ones. Reality is the ultimate arbiter. One can only make sure that a framework is ontologically adequate by stepping down to the lower levels in order to model some domain within the framework, implement the model in a computer program, and test it. Therefore, the general frame problem should be addressed on all four levels in Table 2 : An evaluation of previous work on the frame problem logicians and AI researchers have addressed the frame problem. A resulting`historical account' of research on the frame problem is pictured in table 2.
With respect to table 2, we remark that the positioning of a problem on an abstraction level means that the problem should be addressed at that level and those below it. In reality, however, validation at the lower levels has often not (or incompletely) been performed.
Quali cation and Rami cation Revisited
We situate the quali cation and rami cation problems at the modeling rather than the ontological level. These problems arise only as a consequence of a decision, taken at the ontological level, namely to de ne actions in terms of preconditions (or quali cations) and e ects (or rami cations). The distinction between quali cations and rami cations on one hand, and preconditions and e ects on the other is based on a distinction between \typical" and \atypical" consequences of an action.
Quali cations and rami cations generally refer to hidden preconditions and e ects of an action, that is, preconditions and e ects which are atypical. What is considered \typical" in this context, is generally determined by the goal, the intent with which the action is performed. Whereas this may seem natural, its adequacy for real world problem solving is questionable. The notions of precondition, quali cation, (intended) e ect and rami cation hinge on the assumption that we always have the same intention when performing a speci c action. For one thing, this e ectively rules out the inventivity embodied in using an action to accomplish some goal not normally associated with the action. But even in view of \routine" human problem solving behavior, it is extremely in exible. One may open a window with various intentions: to sit in the sun, to provide ventilation, to call the children home for dinner, to let a bee out. Each of these goals induces its own preconditions and quali cations, as well as intended e ects. Summarizing, we feel that the quali cation and rami cation problem are problems associated with a speci c (and not very promising) attempt to solve the frame problem, rather than inherent to the problem itself. That is why it should be situated on the modeling level, rather than the ontological one. On the ontological level, the frame problem comprises the more fundamental problem of articulating the changes an action will bring about in various circumstances, and representing this in a surveyable manner.
The General Frame Problem Revisited
Insu cient awareness of the distinction between a problem and a problem instance, may serve as a plausible explanation for Hayes' frustration over his incapacity to solve something \so simple" as the frame problem. The toughness of the frame problem which we are confronted with upon attempting to design a robot that is capable of opening doors in the real world, can, for the greater part, be traced back to the discrepancy between the action \open door" in general and a particular instance of \open door", that is, opening a speci c door in speci c circumstances. Whereas the latter will in most cases leave most of the circumstances una ected, this is absolutely not true for the former.
This brings us back to Dreyfus' view of the frame problem as a problem with the symbolic paradigm. We think that the annoyance which Hayes felt with respect to the frame problem, is a symptom of the impotence of language (that is, any symbol system) as a tool to statically prescribe adequate behavior. Language is adequate for communication with other human beings, provided that there is a su cient common or comparable experiential and conventional basis. It has proven to be much less adequate, however, for prescription of real-world behavior to a computer. It seems plausible that the incorporation of skill acquisition in problem solving is an absolute necessity to achieve adequate autonomous behavior in a real-world environment.
The Logical Frame Problem Revisited
To justify positioning the logical frame problem at the implementational level, it is important to be aware of the extent in which circumscription-based approaches to the logical frame problem help us in overcoming the higher-level problems. In this respect, we observe that circumscriptive formalizations like chronological ignorance 14] solve the problems of quali cation and rami cation in a very limited sense only. The descriptions of actions in this framework enable a \robot designer" to distinguish between preconditions that should be provably true and those that need only be not provably false, thus enabling a robot to handle quali cations. However, the chronological ignorance framework does not address the discovery of quali cations. As such, it deals with quali cation at the implementational level, but it does not address the problem at the modeling level.
The possible worlds approach to AI planning 5] 6] comes somewhat closer to solution, in that it describes how quali cations and rami cations may be discovered from general domain constraints. However, it is acknowledged in 6] that distinguishing between quali cations and rami cations is problematic in their approach and that quali cations may be missed if the granularity of the action description is too coarse. The approach o ers no clear-cut directives as to how coarse an action description may be. As such, the possible world approach seems to shift the demarcation problem of specifying quali cations and rami cations to the speci cation of domain constraints. This may in some cases alleviate the problem, but it does not really solve it.
The Relevance of the Frame Problem
As for the question to what extent a solution to the frame problem might contribute to our ultimate goal, the previous sections more or less suggest that we should not expect much. Should we expect anything? Is the frame problem relevant at all to the engineering problem of constructing an autonomous robot? If one assumes classical AI planning to be the (only) technique with which the ultimate goal of creating intelligent robots can be achieved, the relevance of the frame problem for robotics is obvious. At present, however, many AI researchers believe that classical planning is not liable of bringing the ultimate goal much closer. Furthermore, some new approaches, like plan-as-communication 1] and the subsumption architecture 2] drastically reduce the importance of adequate (a priori) representation. If a priori representation is no longer a key issue, the same goes for the frame problem.
Though we regard approaches like the subsumption architecture as a promising one for autonomous robotics, we would be pleased with robots that are not completely autonomous in that they act in accordance with (sensible) verbal requests. A robot should preferably be able to grasp the intention of a directive given to it, and be able to distinguish situational characteristics that would cause contemplated actions to have other than intended, disastrous consequences. In this context, we still see some usefulness for the notion of \frame problem". However, its semantics should be changed from \the problem of representing change" to \the problem of getting a robot to sensibly obey verbal commands". It is by no means certain that the solution to this problem should be sought in a suitable representation. In any case, the problem is highly dependent on the way in which the robot's behavior is generated. In view of the fact that the exploration of new paths of research in this area has just begun, elaboration of this communication problem seems rather premature at present.
